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Abstract 
In this article, we use the New Zealand emissions trading scheme to explore how 
diffusion and learning from other emissions trading systems can explain the adoption, 
design, and revision of climate policy. Drawing on secondary documents and interviews 
with politicians, government officials, business leaders, and independent commentators, 
we argue for further investigation of how interactions between international and 
domestic factors shape the design of climate policy, and for deeper probing of structural 
and shorter-term domestic imperatives, to avoid misreading the extent and nature of 
international diffusion influences. We particularly stress the importance of 
distinguishing analytically between diffusion interactions motivated by learning 
between jurisdictions and scrutiny aimed at avoiding material disadvantages as a result 
of miscalculations in climate policy design. Finally, we argue for greater attention to the 
temporal dimensions of climate policy development in explanations of how diffusion 
and domestic influences may change during policy adoption, design, and revision. 
 
 
Following the introduction of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) in 2005, 
several other political jurisdictions established or started developing market-based 
ETSs, including California, Kazakhstan, Montreal, South Korea, China, New Zealand, and 
Australia.1 The spread of ETSs across diverse economic and political contexts has led to 
growing interest in why and how particular models of climate governance are taken up 
by different countries (Voß 2007). The literature has focused especially on how policy 
diffusion—the systematic influencing of government decisions by prior decisions in 
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other countries (Simmons et al. 2006)—explains the patterns and processes through 
which different methods of governing environmental problems spread (Jordan and 
Huitema 2014). Although this work has provided valuable insights on the shared and 
differentiated drivers that affect the spread of particular environmental policy 
instruments (Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Graham et al. 2013; Jacobs 2014), most 
studies have focused on the decisions to adopt such policies. Consequently, many policy 
diffusion studies have struggled to capture the dynamic nature of policy development 
(see Bailey 2002; Carlson 2008, for exceptions) and have not examined the detailed 
design features that determine the effectiveness and efficiency of policies such as 
emissions trading.  
Although recent research has directed attention to drivers and processes 
affecting the design features of ETS (e.g., Wettestad and Gulbrandsen 2015), few detailed 
studies exist of the mechanisms shaping their design—and thus how diffusion and 
domestic influences interact during policy development and reform. Although this has 
been attempted by complementary approaches (see Marsh and Sharman 2009), the aim 
of this article is to contribute to this strand of the policy diffusion literature by 
examining the factors that shape ETS design and evolution, on the basis of an analysis of 
the New Zealand emissions trading scheme (NZ ETS). We address three questions: why 
was the NZ ETS adopted?, what factors explain its design and evolution?, and what wider 
lessons can be drawn about interactions between diffusion and domestic influences during 
climate policy development?  
Developing the NZ ETS involved detailed examination of other ETSs, particularly 
the EU ETS and the failed Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS). 
However, the resultant model showed appreciable differences from these “templates” in 
the sectors and gases included, approaches to emission caps, and subsequent scheme 
revisions (Bailey and Inderberg 2016; Bertram and Terry 2010; Bullock 2012; Calel 
2013; Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel 2011). The processes underlying this 
outcome require deeper investigation, to enable wider inferences about the roles of 
diffusion and other factors in the design of ETSs and other climate policies.  
To acquire the depth of information required to process trace factors influencing 
the design of the NZ ETS, our analysis utilizes official reports, party and cabinet papers, 
and public reports alongside twenty-two expert interviews. The interviews were 
conducted in mid-2015 with five New Zealand politicians from varying roles and parties, 
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four government officials from different departments, seven independent analysts, and 
six business leaders involved in designing, advising, or commenting on the scheme. The 
interviewees were selected by using prior mapping from documentary sources 
alongside a snowball approach during the interview period. Efforts were made to 
balance the organizations represented and to incorporate critical voices, supporters of 
the scheme, and politicians from different parties. However, some difficulties were 
encountered. It proved difficult to recruit experts from the NGO sector, because 
relatively few NGO representatives had technical expertise about the scheme or detailed 
knowledge of the political processes involved in designing it. This was compensated for 
through interviews with independent analysts who have commented on the scheme’s 
design. The interviews included questions about the adoption, design, and changes to 
the NZ ETS; the main actors involved; the political processes associated with the 
scheme’s development; and sources of information and idea gathering. The interviews 
were also tailored to the particular areas of expertise of each interviewee. We 
transcribed the interviews, and sent them to the interviewees for approval. Although our 
interviews were the primary source of information for understanding the formal and 
informal processes involved in designing the NZ ETS, this information was triangulated 
with official documents and research papers to produce reliable and representative 
insights into the process of developing the NZ ETS.  
ETS Design Understood Through an Interacting-Drivers Approach 
In analyzing the factors conditioning the creation and revision of the NZ ETS, our general 
expectation was of multifaceted and dynamic interactions between international and 
national influences (Jordan et al. 2003). Although it is helpful for analytical purposes to 
distinguish between domestic and international influences and to examine the 
“interactions” between them, clearly such influences are not easily separable (Marsh and 
Sharman 2009). As Rose (1991, 21) notes: “We would never expect a program to 
transfer from one government to another without history, culture and institutions being 
taken into account.” Our account of the conditions affecting the adoption and design of 
the NZ ETS therefore emphasizes how international diffusion and domestic factors act 
conjointly to coproduce policy outcomes. Since the division between mechanisms is 
somewhat artificial (Marsh and Sharman 2009), our analysis consciously involves 
elements of stylization. The analytical distinctions nevertheless provide a basis for 
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elucidating the most important factors and processes that have shaped the NZ ETS. We 
begin by outlining the main features of these perspectives. 
The Diffusion Perspective 
Diffusion refers to processes through which changes in one state’s policy choices are 
identifiably influenced by prior policy choices in another jurisdiction, as a result of direct 
or indirect interactions (Simmons et al. 2006). Although this implies that diffusion 
usually prompts policy convergence, it can equally provoke divergence if knowledge 
acquisition spurs the rejection of approaches used elsewhere (Klingler-Vidra and 
Schleifer 2014). However, including both possibilities would create conceptual 
messiness if depicting all interactions as diffusion were to inadvertently overmagnify 
international diffusion as an explanation for ETS design. 
Diffusion generally occurs in response to two main triggers: material 
consequences and/or learning (Underdal 2013; Underdal et al. 2015). The material 
consequences typically relate to traceable impacts from policy decisions made 
elsewhere (Keohane and Nye 1977), based on some form of bounded rational reasoning 
(Simons 1991). These may be coercive: for instance, dependencies created by trade links 
or international treaties that promote certain policies and design features, whereby “to 
access certain resources, national governments must comply with given policy 
requirements” (Gilardi 2013, 463). Indications of coercive forces include implicit or 
explicit threats unless certain policies are adopted—or, more likely, legally binding 
decisions made via supranational processes, such as international climate or trade 
agreements. Material consequences may also be competitive—related, for example, to 
design features aimed at countering economic disadvantages created by another 
country’s policies rather than by domestic factors. The typical example is tax 
competition and a race to the bottom to attract economic benefits, but there are also 
examples of competition for leadership, in which gaining access to important export 
markets pushes countries to strengthen environmental regulation (Gilardi 2013; 
Underdal 2013). Such asymmetric dependency might be indicated by explicit references 
to competitive concerns arising from decisions made by key trading partners. 
Learning in the present context relates to the travel and impact of policy ideas 
(Rose 1991; Røvik 2011) from abroad or within countries by means of relevant actors 
and networks in response to cognitive and/or normative triggers. Learning can be 
further divided into two main mechanisms. Sophisticated learning is typified, inter alia, 
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by discussion papers and debates leading to identifiable decisions and design features 
adopting, in modified form, policy approaches used by other countries. Here, new 
information is considered and applied in a bounded rational way from policy examples 
in other countries or international networks (Underdal 2013). Simple emulation is 
indicated by relatively uncritical assessments of external models and direct copying of 
ETS features. Emulation represents a more normative adoption mechanism—where 
such adoption does not follow identifiably rational reasoning, but instead is based on 
preconceptions of legitimacy or the professed appropriateness of model for a given 
situation (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
The Domestic Perspective 
Domestic factors influencing policy adoption have been theorized in different ways, and 
there have been calls to incorporate these factors when analyzing diffusion (Marsh and 
Sharman 2009). For analytical purposes, we divide the conditioning of diffusion 
influences by national factors into structural/slow-changing national conditions and 
dynamic and more short-term factors (Bailey et al. 2012; Inderberg and Wettestad 2015). 
Additionally, events may form a subset of domestic influences, because of their 
unpredictability and relative independence from—but sometimes profound impact on—
decision-making. 
We further define structural conditions, or the prevailing characteristics of 
countries, as far-reaching and slow-changing influences that span economic, political, 
and sociocultural conditions to affect policy development and international diffusion. 
Such structural factors typically include the economy’s external dependencies, economic 
profile, emissions portfolio, types and strengths of political traditions, and national self-
image, all of which “position” countries and contribute to constructions of their national 
interests (Bührs 2008; Moravscik 1997). In line with “goodness of fit” theory (Bailey 
2002; Börzel and Risse 2003), the adoption and design of environmental policy models 
may be at least partly conditioned by their congruence with national interests and policy 
approaches. For example, New Zealand’s reliance on trade-exposed primary sectors sits 
uneasily with the uncritical adoption of high carbon prices not adopted by competitor 
countries. We might therefore expect greater compatibility between an ETS design 
feature and key national characteristics or preferences to increase the chances of 
adoption in some form. Conversely, larger nonconformities would encourage 
nonadoption or greater adaptation of the design elements. Particular emissions trading 
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features may also be adopted for symbolic purposes. For example, rhetoric may 
emphasize emissions trading for image-building purposes, even if most emission 
reductions are achieved using nontrading instruments (Victor 2009). Similarly, price-
management or assistance measures may be adopted to promote stakeholder 
acceptance rather than to offset proven economic or distributional impacts (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). 
Dynamic factors typically occur when interest groups seek to maximize their 
interests and/or political leverage (Moravscik 1997). Stable equilibria of interests, 
preferences, and coalitions are rare within domestic politics, not least because political 
parties support different interest constituencies and influence political debates to 
varying degrees (Eikeland and Inderberg 2016). Political changes and lobbying may 
alter coalitions and preferences, prompting variations in diffusion outcomes for specific 
design elements and policy choices. Investigating domestic influences on diffusion 
outcomes necessitates examining party stances on the NZ ETS (and the political 
interests influencing these stances) as well as shifts in the influences of political parties. 
Again, the general expectation is that incumbents may seek to modify an ETS design to 
accommodate the major interests of their constituencies.  
The next issue concerns the effects of events on increasing or reducing the 
leverage of different arguments and groups. These effects are difficult to theorize 
predictively, though events are widely recognized as influencing institutional and 
political processes (Arthur 1989; Collier and Collier 1991; Inderberg 2012). Such events 
may relate directly or indirectly to climate and energy issues and may occur at the 
international or country level—but in both cases, they provide policy entrepreneurs and 
interest groups with windows of opportunity to steer public agendas and influence 
policy choices and diffusion processes toward their interests (Boasson 2014). For 
example, the global financial crisis produced far-reaching impacts and created 
recessionary pressures that reduced emissions and contributed to low EU carbon prices, 
but it also served to lessen political and public appetites for climate action in many 
countries. 
The NZ ETS and the Adoption Process  
The NZ ETS was established as New Zealand’s cornerstone climate mitigation policy 
under the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act in September 
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2008. The ETS set single-year allowance trading and compliance periods using (mostly) 
freely allocated emission units and surrender obligations based on historic absolute 
emissions. Initially, participants were required to surrender one NZ unit (NZU) for each 
ton of CO2 equivalent emitted. However, although the number of NZUs issued was 
limited, unrestricted access to international units was also permitted, leading to an ETS 
without a fixed national cap because the scheme did not establish an emission reduction 
trajectory or binding domestic emission limits beyond New Zealand’s Kyoto 
commitment to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2008–2012 (New Zealand 
Government 2007a). The approach was instead designed to promote abatement via 
pricing and trading rather than genuine cap and trade (Bertram and Terry 2010). 
 The 2008 legislation envisaged a phasing in of sectors: forestry (2008); liquid 
fossil fuels, mainly transport (2009); stationary-energy and industrial processes (2010); 
agriculture (originally 2013, now deferred); and waste (2013) (New Zealand 
Government 2007a). Phasing in was based principally on the perceived feasibility of 
involvement in the ETS rather than on clear prioritization based on contributions to 
reducing emissions. The main contributors to New Zealand’s emissions profile at the 
time were agriculture (49%), energy (43%), and transport (19%) (New Zealand 
Government 2007a). 
In November 2008, following the passage of the ETS Act the previous month, the 
Labour government lost the general election and was replaced by a minority 
government led by the National Party, working with the ACT Party, Maori Party, and 
United Future. The NZ ETS quickly became a target for revision by the National Party. 
The first two revisions of the NZ ETS took place in 2009 and 2012, and a further review 
was ongoing in 2016. The first revision included several transitional arrangements that 
reflected the new government’s agenda and attempts to align the NZ ETS with the CPRS 
being developed in Australia (Bullock 2012). These included delays to the inclusion of 
some sectors, notably agriculture, until 2015; the creation of a “one-for-two” measure, 
permitting certain sectors to surrender one NZU for every two tons of emissions; and a 
$25 per ton cap on allowances (Bullock 2012, 662–663). The 2009 reform also altered 
the basis of allowance allocations, from absolute allocations based on 1990 emissions to 
intensity-based allocations on output measured against estimated industry averages. 
The 2012 revision was notable for the government’s refusal to enact changes 
recommended by the Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel (2011)—an independent 
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body established to provide advice on the scheme—that transition measures should be 
phased out and agriculture phased in, although another recommendation to remove 
prescheduled reviews of the ETS was adopted. In the last review, the government 
decided to phase out the “one-for-two” measure between 2017 and 2019. 
Conditions Shaping the Adoption and Design of the NZ ETS 
The Drivers Influencing the Adoption of the NZ ETS 
Several international diffusion mechanisms were found to have influenced the adoption 
of the NZ ETS. The first was the ideational and material impacts of the Kyoto Protocol. 
This was the only coercive material-consequences mechanism found, because failing to 
provide a policy response to Kyoto would have been viewed unfavorably by the 
international community,2 and several interviewees argued that Kyoto was a significant 
driver for the ETS (and for later strategic decisions). Internal policy notes and official 
references further indicate that awareness of an international trend toward creating 
ETSs added to the momentum for this policy solution, whereas other documents refer to 
reputational factors, in particular to the NZ ETS as the “[f]irst domestic scheme in the 
world to include obligations for agriculture” (New Zealand Government 2007b, 7).  
International impacts, however, extended beyond Kyoto to the political and 
ideational influences of other ETSs. As one interviewee put it: “The EU ETS was very 
important because it proved . . . that emissions trading could work” (independent 
technical expert). Additionally, when asked about the effectiveness and suitability of the 
EU ETS for New Zealand’s export-oriented and land-use-based economy, officials 
provided mixed assessments. Nevertheless, they felt that participation in international 
networks had helped persuade the Clark government of the merits of an ETS. 
In addition to these fairly standard international diffusion mechanisms, the 
political challenges created by New Zealand’s atypical emissions portfolio were 
identified as pivotal in the adoption and design of the NZ ETS. Unlike most other OECD 
countries, New Zealand’s stationary-energy emissions are relatively low because around 
80 percent of electricity generation comes from renewable sources (New Zealand 
Government 2015, 42), whereas New Zealand’s agricultural sector still produces nearly 
49 percent of national emissions. Additionally, New Zealand accounts for just 0.15–0.2 
                                                        
2 However, one business-sector interviewee referred to the government’s “cavalier” adoption of the Kyoto 
target and saw it as opening up a Pandora’s box for New Zealand businesses. 
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percent of global emissions, although it ranks 12th globally in per-capita emissions as a 
result of its emissions-intensive primary export industries and reliance on private 
transport (New Zealand Government 2007a, 2). Political challenges for the ETS thus 
included the limited scope for further decarbonization of the electricity sector (often a 
main target of ETSs), technological and economic obstacles to reducing agricultural 
emissions, and the limited climate impact of reducing New Zealand’s emissions, as 
compared with the potential economic impacts of stringent climate policies (Jiang et al. 
2009). Although New Zealand has the potential for reducing transport emissions, its lack 
of motor-vehicle manufacturing and small, dispersed population create challenges for 
large-scale emission reductions (Bailey and Inderberg 2016; Bertram and Terry 2010). 
The adoption of the NZ ETS was also significantly conditioned by developments 
in New Zealand politics. The Labour Party had held power for three consecutive terms 
under Helen Clark by the time the ETS was negotiated in 2008, and the widespread 
expectation was that Labour would lose the 2008 election. Additionally, the government 
had originally proposed a carbon tax in 2005 as its response to Kyoto, but this was 
abandoned following fierce resistance from the National Party and major interest 
groups, who dubbed it “the fart tax” for including methane emissions from ruminant 
animals. These two factors significantly narrowed the government’s policy options (New 
Zealand Government 2007b) and contributed to the ETS emerging as the main candidate 
policy for discharging New Zealand’s Kyoto obligation. This pressure was intensified by 
the government’s previous reliance on “voluntary and informational instruments,” an 
approach that had resulted in emissions increasing 24.7 percent above 1990 levels by 
2005 (Bührs 2008, 65). 
Another national characteristic mentioned by interviewees was that a market-
based instrument corresponded well with a neoliberally minded approach to economic 
management in key government departments, particularly the Treasury. Interviewees 
referred to the “Rogernomics”3 economic reforms that began in 1984, triggering far-
reaching market-led restructuring and deregulation that has since solidified into a 
general preference for market-based approaches. 
Another important domestic characteristic was awareness of the need for any 
future climate policy instrument to manage forestry issues. Although forestry is an 
                                                        
3 A portmanteau term drawing parallels between the economic reforms initiated in the 1980s under 
Minister of Finance Roger Douglas and US “Reaganomics.” 
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international consideration under the Kyoto Protocol, it forms more of a domestic 
characteristic within New Zealand, because of the large contribution of land-use 
activities to the country’s emissions. Discussions particularly focused on potential 
emission liabilities arising from deforestation and the climate and financial benefits 
from creating forestry-related credits within the ETS, with the latter becoming a key 
driver for the adoption of a market-based mechanism (New Zealand Government 
2007a).  
Other important drivers can be traced to interplays between material 
consequences and national characteristics. One recurring argument among interviewees 
was that the Kyoto target was portrayed as a significant future financial liability for New 
Zealand, which could compromise the competitiveness of its specialized and trade-
exposed economy. Kyoto was further presented as a burden on taxpayers if the 
government was forced to buy large quantities of international units. An ETS could 
correspondingly be presented as a way of devolving and reducing financial risk while 
incentivizing abatement by pricing carbon in an open market—a view reinforced by the 
early inclusion of mandatory obligations for pre-1990 forests to reduce deforestation 
liabilities. This liability could theoretically have been managed using a carbon tax; 
however, the prospect of gaining financially from selling afforestation credits from post-
1989 forests on international markets added to arguments for an ETS. Allied to this was 
New Zealand’s efficiency in key sectors, especially agriculture, and the prospect of 
protecting and exporting these efficiencies through New Zealand’s involvement in an 
ETS involving international trading. The latter argument thus blends elements of 
protectionism with country-specific comparative advantages—although forest credits 
have more recently become a potential liability, because low NZU prices have not 
incentivized new planting or deterred harvesting and the conversion of forest to 
dairying (Luth Richter and Chambers 2014). 
Factors Influencing Design Features of the NZ ETS 
As with the original decision to adopt the ETS, interviewees indicated that the scheme’s 
design was informed by a combination of international ideational influences, material 
consequences, and domestic political pressures. To explain these interactions and the 
political ethos affecting the design features, it is useful to identify the main actors 
involved in the design process. Arguably the most influential was the Treasury, through 
its role in the Emissions Trading Group (ETG)—the cross-government team tasked with 
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developing proposals for the scheme’s design—and other ministerial forums. The ETG 
was led by the Ministry for the Environment and included technical experts from 
Environment, Treasury, Economic Development, Transport, and Agriculture and 
Forestry, but it was housed at the Treasury. Other expert groups who advised on the 
strategic or operational ETS design included the Climate Change Leadership Forum, a 
body with high-level representation from relevant ministries and the private sector 
(agriculture, energy, forestry, and industry), and sector-specific groups such as the 
Electricity Allocation Factor Contact Group and the Business Opportunities Working 
Group. The composition of these groups guaranteed representation and links to 
government officials for industry, as well as ensuring a prominent role for the Treasury 
in defining the ETS’s goals and financial parameters. As might be expected, the Ministry 
for the Environment favored more stringent design features, whereas the Treasury and 
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment advocated a more business-
friendly design. The Ministry for Primary Industries maneuvered between these camps, 
seeking to maximize the benefits of forest credits while protecting its sectors. The 
government, spurred by technical and lobby groups, was nevertheless instrumental in 
filtering international diffusion influences through perceptions of national interests 
during the detailed design of the NZ ETS. 
One striking example of this was the decision to avoid a scheme-specific cap 
(unlike most national ETSs) and to create only a weak link between the number of units 
available and national emission targets (Bertram and Terry 2010). This choice primarily 
reflected the adaptation of diffusion influences to improve their fit with identified 
national characteristics and the protection of strategic primary industries. Interviewees 
from both the public and corporate sectors argued that the absence of defined caps drew 
heavily on the logic of Kyoto trading, rather than on other cap-and-trade schemes. 
Several interviewees further noted that the cap design was based on predetermined 
“economic first principles.” In practice this meant that decisions on strategic design 
issues to align the ETS with New Zealand’s open trading economy were made prior to 
designing features that suited these principles. Prior to 2008, a design working group 
undertook a detailed review of the EU ETS but decided that problems with the EU 
scheme and major differences from the New Zealand context meant that the EU scheme 
mainly “provided examples for how not to do it.” 
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Similar reasoning informed the emission reduction ambition of the NZ ETS, which 
is generally regarded as low, despite aligning with New Zealand’s Kyoto target. However, 
this has been accompanied by the almost-total removal or nonimplementation of such 
complementary measures as renewable energy targets, direct expenditure, or other 
policies. Several interviewees remarked that this reflected the general neoliberal ethos 
in the New Zealand political economy and, especially, Treasury’s influence over the ETS 
design. Interviewees who expressed support for the ETS also noted a widespread belief 
among key advisors that pricing carbon through a well-designed ETS would flow 
dynamically through all sectors of the economy to incentivize abatement, and that there 
was no case for creating regulatory “double jeopardies” by introducing complementary 
measures. 
Many allowances are allocated free of charge to participants, on the basis of 
varying rationales. Fisheries (although not mandatory participants) receive allowances 
based on historical emissions; owners of pre-1990 forests received fixed free 
allocations; energy-intensive, trade-exposed industrial sectors receive 90 percent free 
allowances based on output-intensity modeling; and moderately exposed sectors receive 
60 percent free allocations (iCap 2016). This change occurred after the 2009 revisions, 
when the scheme moved from allocations based on absolute historic emissions to 
production-based allocations. The latter allocations were based on design work for the 
Australian CPRS and were criticized by interviewees as inappropriate for New Zealand 
because even comparable industries have divergent fuel sources and emissions profiles. 
This was the closest example of simple emulation from another country, but it still 
caused controversy when dairying failed to qualify for free allowances based on these 
metrics. This was cited as a key factor behind the delay in including biological 
agricultural emissions in the scheme. 
In theory, the NZ ETS has broader sector and gases coverage than other national 
ETSs, although its “all-gases, all-sectors” approach has been eroded by transitional 
periods introduced in the 2009 revisions (Diaz-Rainey and Tulloch 2016). The decision 
to include all gases and sectors was prompted by the high representation of agriculture 
and forestry in New Zealand’s emissions profile (New Zealand Government 2007b). 
Interviewees indicated that this was seen as essential for target achievement because 
stationary electricity is predominantly derived from renewable sources (New Zealand 
Government 2015, 42). Successive delays in the inclusion of agriculture again reflect 
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domestic sector lobbying about competitive material consequences, due to a dearth of 
affordable options for reducing biological emissions and the dangers of increasing 
production costs for lower-value export sectors, such as dairy and meat. 
In terms of reporting emission reductions, the government’s preference has been 
for points of obligation as far “upstream” as possible within sectors to reduce the 
number of entities monitored and administrative complexity/costs. Again, this reflects 
domestic preferences—in this case, the first-principle and neoliberal economic 
discourses in New Zealand portraying the Kyoto target as a financial burden and the 
main purpose of the ETS as a low-cost policy for discharging the burden. Officials 
examined the EU’s target installations approach and opted instead for upstream 
obligations to reflect institutional preferences for administrative efficiency and because 
sectors such as aluminum and steel consist of just one or two players. The main conflict 
on obligations has been agriculture, in which the government preferred upstream 
obligations but the sector has pressed for on-farm obligations to create incentives 
through which emission reductions could best be achieved and rewards recognized. This 
again has impeded the full inclusion of agriculture within the ETS. 
Several interviewees noted that, until June 2016, the NZ ETS was almost entirely 
open to using international credits to offset domestic emissions (although some 
restrictions were implemented in 2011 and 2012 to reduce problems with both “hot air” 
and fraudulent units and to maintain system integrity). The NZ ETS is not officially 
linked to other schemes, but discussions were held with the EU and Australia to 
investigate linking possibilities. Additionally, prior to its decision not to ratify Kyoto II, 
New Zealand had relied heavily on external offsets to discharge its international 
commitments, justified by the perceived lack of technically feasible and/or affordable 
abatement options in agriculture. Coupled with this was the opportunity for New 
Zealand to benefit financially from selling forestry credits overseas. Again, both 
represent domestic pressures and material consequences linked to maintaining 
competitiveness. Closing the ETS to the surrender of international units in the NZ ETS by 
June 2015 was attributed to leaving Kyoto II, which closed New Zealand’s access to 
Kyoto trading mechanisms (Diaz-Rainey and Tulloch 2016; Macey 2014). Some 
restrictions were placed on the sale of units overseas during the transition period 
(legislated to end on December 31, 2012) to add robustness to the scheme. However, 
this connection was fairly notional, since it excluded forest-removal credits, an issue that 
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led to differences of opinion between New Zealand and the EU during their linking 
discussions. 
Monitoring in the NZ ETS differs from that in many other schemes, in that it 
principally involves self-reporting by target entities; selective third-party auditing is 
required only to ensure integrity or when participants apply to use nonstandard 
emission factors. The main justification for this mentioned by interviewees was that self-
reporting works well in the New Zealand tax system and had proved robust during 
preparatory work for the carbon tax. As with point-of-obligation requirements, officials 
scrutinized approaches used elsewhere but preferred self-reporting; interviewees 
maintained that the system operated efficiently, and there is little evidence of 
international diffusion on monitoring, reporting, and verification.  
A price ceiling of NZ$ 25 per ton was introduced under the 2009 ETS reforms, but 
no price floor has been established. No other government had set a price ceiling at the 
time (Australia’s fixed price was not adopted until 2011), so this is again attributable 
mainly to domestic lobbying to protect trade-exposed industries against upward price 
risk. A further unique price management measure was the decision in 2009 only to 
require stationary-energy, fossil-fuel, and industrial entities to surrender one NZU for 
two tons of CO2 equivalent emitted. A temporary measure extended on the grounds that 
competitors (particularly the US and Australia) had not introduced emissions trading, it 
was a priority issue under the 2015–2016 review and will be phased out by 2019 
(Ministry for the Environment 2015; Ministry for the Environment 2016). Additionally, 
although the government has maintained faith in the allocative efficiencies of a market-
based instrument, the NZ ETS contains only peripheral commitments to earmarking 
revenues and remains the dominant policy for curbing emissions.  
Although interviewees maintained that the main features and parameters of the 
ETS design were informed primarily by sophisticated learning in response to domestic 
pressures and the material consequences of New Zealand’s Kyoto target, evidence exists of 
active scrutiny and the adapted incorporation of technical features from other ETSs. 
Major examples include the emission conversion factors used for different sectors, 
which were largely borrowed from the Australian CPRS, and the design of rules for 
forestry to ensure their compatibility with Kyoto accounting standards. 
Most design characteristics were finalized by the ministries-led ETG, but as noted, 
technical discussions involved a range of cross-sectoral groups, including the Technical 
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Advisory Group, the Electricity Allocation Factor Contact Group, and the Ministries of 
Agriculture, Forestry Measurement, Stationary Energy and Industrial Processes, 
Transport Fuels, and Waste, representing industry sectors, ministries, local government, 
and independent analysts. This gave affected industries multiple opportunities to raise 
issues and influence technical design issues. These groups were also aided by more 
dynamic domestic factors, not least the election of the National Party government in 
2008. Although National opposed the original ETS bill, they supported an ETS in 
principle and worked in government via the 2009 and 2012 revisions to tailor its 
provisions while preserving the scheme’s architecture.  
Analyzing International and Domestic Influences in Combination  
With the main factors influencing the adoption and design of the NZ ETS now identified, 
this section will summarize the main findings and then use them to explore an 
integrated “interacting-drivers” perspective, in an attempt to capture more fully how 
diffusion and domestic factors interacted to shape the design of an ETS as a particular 
form of climate policy. 
International Diffusion 
The preceding analysis shows that international diffusion played a fairly modest role in 
the design of the NZ ETS and that diffusion influences were closely scrutinized for their 
compatibility with the government’s “first economic principles” for ETS adoption and 
design. Interviewees argued that designing the market was, in fact, reasonably 
straightforward once these principles had been established and suitable cross-
ministerial expertise enlisted. The process was also facilitated by technical competence 
gained from the failed carbon-tax proposal, which aided the analysis of design elements 
from other schemes against New Zealand’s circumstances and perceived national 
interests. Because internal expertise was appreciably controlled by the Treasury, both 
the first principles and the ETS design were steered toward reducing the cost of meeting 
New Zealand’s Kyoto target. 
For these reasons, international material consequences emerged as the main 
diffusion influence on the initial design and revisions of the NZ ETS, although learning as 
a result of participation in the Kyoto negotiations and other international networks was 
more evident in the decision to adopt an ETS at all. In particular, the absence of an 
overall emission cap, the ceiling price, measures allowing some sectors to surrender one 
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NZU for every two tons of emissions, and the exclusion of agricultural biological 
emissions all indicate divergence from other national schemes, underpinned by a 
defensive approach to mitigating international material consequences.  
National Interest and Domestic Politics  
The prominence of international material consequences indicates that national interests 
and domestic politics exerted powerful conditioning effects on the NZ ETS. Decisions on 
the adoption and timing of a market-based instrument also showed domestic political 
influences, not least Labour’s commitment to introduce the NZ ETS before the 2008 
election following the failed carbon tax, as well as subsequent moves by the National 
Party government to revise the scheme in response to key agricultural and business 
constituencies.  
However, domestic influences appear to have extended beyond pure interest-
group lobbying (Benwell 2008) to the wider processes used to determine New Zealand’s 
national interests in climate mitigation. In particular, interviewees cited general 
equilibrium models of the impacts of different emission and carbon-price scenarios 
produced by New Zealand–based organizations such as Motu, NZIER,4 and Infometrics. 
Here, interviewees indicated sophisticated learning by officials and politicians, whereby 
modeling was matched with higher-level first principles, rather than design features 
being shaped primarily by adapting design features from other schemes. Much of the NZ 
ETS can thus be understood in terms of “goodness of fit” between key officials’ and 
politicians’ interpretations of the national interests and design features in other ETSs. 
Generally speaking, diverging goodness of fit between domestic priorities and their ETS 
design models prompted active sophisticated learning, leading to diverging ETS 
outcomes. 
International comparisons (particularly with the EU ETS and the Australian 
scheme) were important to the discussions on ETS design. However, the principal 
objectives here appear to have been to defend New Zealand’s competitive advantages; to 
limit taxpayer burdens (an electoral acceptability goal); and to meet international 
obligations, rather than learning about policy design in its purer sense. This is illustrated 
by the emphasis on international credits, although differences between the EU’s and 
New Zealand’s circumstances made formal linking difficult, and attention instead 
                                                        
4 New Zealand Institute of Economic Research: http://nzier.org.nz/.  
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focused on New Zealand’s largest trading partner, Australia, with whom greater 
commonalities appeared to exist. 
The Role of Events 
Alongside international and domestic political influences, other events that have 
contributed to revisions of the NZ ETS warrant mentioning. The global financial crisis 
began soon after the ETS was legislated; it hit New Zealand hard, giving interest groups 
increased leverage to lobby for design changes. The weak outcome of the Copenhagen 
climate conference in 2009, meanwhile, sent signals that New Zealand should maintain a 
cautious approach to carbon pricing—a view compounded in 2010 by the collapse of the 
Australian CPRS and the closure of an important prospective link, which additionally fed 
competitiveness concerns because of the two countries’ trade links. Because many 
companies operate across the two countries, politicians and officials feared that some 
might relocate their activities to Australia to avoid carbon pricing. Third, the 2010 and 
2011 Christchurch earthquakes placed added pressures on the economy related to both 
funding reconstruction and insurance premiums, further weakening arguments for 
repealing the 2009 transitional measures. 
Finally, the open nature of the NZ ETS exposed NZU prices to the collapse of 
international emission prices in 2011 (Diaz-Rainey and Tulloch 2016). Interviewees saw 
this as “unfortunate,” and no links were traced to modifications to the scheme. This 
event could have been used to tighten the scheme to bolster NZU prices; that this did not 
happen perhaps provides a further indication of the influence of key interest groups and 
the path dependency in government thinking toward climate policy vis-à-vis economic 
competitiveness. The effects of events are often difficult to predict. However, in the case 
of the NZ ETS, events appear generally to have further concentrated attention toward 
competitive and domestic issues and to have created leverage for reductions in the 
scheme’s ambition rather than for measures to be tightened.  
Interacting-Drivers Perspective on the Design of the NZ ETS  
So far, we have examined diffusion and domestic influences on the NZ ETS in relative 
isolation. In reality, however, those designing the scheme were required to evaluate 
multiple factors simultaneously during changing political circumstances. Accordingly, 
this section seeks to draw the strands of the investigation together by offering 
observations on the extent to which and ways that international diffusion and domestic 
factors interacted to influence the design of an ETS. 
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First, evidence from the New Zealand case suggests that international diffusion 
mechanisms—both ideational and coercive—may be most pronounced during initial 
decision-making on the adoption of emissions trading. The Kyoto Protocol targets 
provided a key driver for politicians to initiate a broad-based debate on New Zealand’s 
climate response, whereas the example of the EU ETS helped engineer political space for 
the NZ ETS by demonstrating that greenhouse gas trading was politically and technically 
feasible. Such interactions also drew politicians and officials into international networks 
that engaged them in dialogue on the advantages and methodologies of emissions 
trading. However, international diffusion provides only a partial explanation for the 
adoption of the NZ ETS, and two domestic considerations appear to have been 
particularly salient: the failure of the carbon-tax proposal, which narrowed down the 
government’s options for responding to the normative agenda of the Kyoto Protocol, and 
the decision to adopt economic first principles as strategic goals for the ETS. While the 
first consideration is traceable to international influences, because developing a national 
climate response was critical to New Zealand’s reputation as a Kyoto signatory, the 
second consideration is indicative of efforts by the government to broaden support for 
an ETS by assessing its economic and social implications and offering reassurances that 
the scheme would not endanger key sectoral interests such as agriculture. Both 
considerations were underpinned by a preference for market-based approaches to 
economic reform, rooted in the political elite and the neoliberal legacy of 1980s 
Rogernomics. 
Second, the evidence indicates that domestic factors can exert an increasing—and 
potentially dominant—influence on strategic decision-making about ETS design 
features. Although analysis of other schemes occurred, the main motivation in this case 
was scrutiny of their fit with New Zealand’s economic and emissions circumstances. This 
draws attention to an important analytical distinction between two types of diffusion 
influences: those motivated by learning, and those motivated primarily by a desire to 
ensure that preferred design features and calibrations do not create competitive or 
other disadvantages, such as problems with linking. Although both types of influences 
involve elements of learning and have the potential to lead to novel design features that 
might later themselves diffuse (Jordan and Huitema 2014), they involve distinct 
cognitive processes. Outright learning is more strongly associated with the diffusion of 
knowledge and ideas (Jordan et al. 2013). The second process can be labeled 
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“competitive impact assessment” and is more analogous to a corporation conducting 
research on competitors to safeguard its markets. In such cases scrutiny is oriented less 
toward learning about ETS design and more toward confirming or recalibrating 
previously made design choices and avoiding a policy miscalculation. Such diffusion 
forces are consequently likely to produce more cautious and bounded changes in 
scheme design, unless a major design disparity with implications for competitiveness or 
linking is identified in light of established preferences about the goals the policy is 
meant to achieve (Jordan et al. 2003; Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer 2014). Active lesson 
drawing, involving mimicking or sophisticated learning from practices that are deemed 
to be effective and appropriate to national circumstances, might become more 
prominent during the technical stages of policy development, once key design 
parameters are established and less politically risky incremental changes are possible. 
These findings also underscore the value of analyzing the temporal dimensions of 
climate policy design. New Zealand’s experiences lend weight to the views that greater 
change (and openness to diffusion) may occur during the early stages of policy 
experimentation, when politicians and officials are more inclined to court ideas from 
overseas and investigate promising design features, and that the political scope for 
change diminishes as the policy design and adaptation “mature.” Although the setting of 
strategic goals for the NZ ETS prior to the start of detailed design work suggests that this 
is not the case, at that time those developing the ETS had limited information about its 
potential impacts on the New Zealand economy. As work on the ETS design progressed, 
accumulated knowledge about these impacts and increased political attention to the ETS 
inhibited radical changes to the scheme that might contravene the government’s 
strategic objectives. 
Finally, deeper understanding of how domestic and international factors interact 
during policy design may emerge from targeted examination of the effects of both 
longer-term strategic factors and shorter-term political factors and events on diffusion 
processes. Broadly speaking, strategic factors—New Zealand’s emissions profile, 
dependent economic relationships, and neoliberal policy traditions—exerted relatively 
stable influences on the ETS design, encouraging predictable and narrow channels of 
policy change based on its “goodness of fit” with established national characteristics. 
Conversely, short-term political factors and events—such as changes in government and 
recessionary periods—might facilitate more noticeable shifts in policy design, though 
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the evidence for this proposition is only ambiguous in this study. Interestingly, in New 
Zealand these factors usually promoted greater introspection rather than openness to 
external ideas, driven by an increased sense of vulnerability and a desire to ensure that 
the design features contributed to achieving key “national” preferences. 
Conclusions 
The integrated analysis of international, domestic, and temporal factors affecting the 
design of emissions trading that we have pursued in this article undoubtedly 
complicates the task of understanding the drivers and mechanisms of climate policy 
design. We nevertheless argue that it offers the prospect of richer understandings of the 
processes shaping climate policy development, by better reflecting the complex and 
dynamic contexts facing decision-makers and officials. In particular, focusing on 
intersections between international and domestic influences guards against 
overprioritizing international diffusion and draws attention to distinguishing between 
international interactions driven by learning or coercion and those motivated by 
avoiding negative material consequences. Thus, the interacting-drivers perspective 
makes important contributions to explaining the existence of both convergent and 
divergent policy outcomes resulting from international interactions. 
This is not to say that diffusion cannot exert significant influences on the 
development of climate policy. In New Zealand, coercive pressures and experiences from 
other countries created the political scope for adopting a market-based instrument by 
compelling action and demonstrating the viability of the ETS approach. However, the 
dominant influence on the detailed design of the NZ ETS was undoubtedly management 
of the potential material consequences of climate action, through establishing New 
Zealand’s “first principles” of emissions trading; aligning the scheme with its major 
trading partner, Australia; and incorporating transitional and other measures (including 
unrestricted access to international credits) to soften the economic impact of the 
scheme. 
These findings indicate several potentially fruitful avenues for future research on 
climate policy development. First, by highlighting the need to look beyond diffusion 
influences, the study draws attention to the possibilities of greater mutual engagement 
between diffusion studies and “goodness-of-fit” and other related theories (Bailey 2002) 
to explain divergences in the designs of different policies. Second, it underlines the value 
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of temporal analysis for developing deeper understandings of how diffusion and 
learning interact across the strategic and technical phases of climate policy 
development. Third, it indicates a need for further examination of the real 
“innovativeness” of many climate policies. Despite the widespread perception of climate 
change as a wicked policy problem requiring innovative solutions, many actors involved 
in developing the NZ ETS already had experience with designing regulated and 
deregulated markets and saw a carbon market as merely another, not particularly 
complex, extension of this process. The traces of these legacies on the NZ ETS—for 
instance, the heavy emphasis on self-reporting and upstream points of obligation—again 
indicates the need for further investigation of the domestic lenses used to evaluate 
different approaches to climate policy. 
In-depth investigation of the factors that contribute to convergence and 
divergence in the processes and outcomes of climate policy development represents an 
important frontier in climate politics research. We have shown that national 
characteristics, policy legacies, party politics, and economic interests are important 
mediators of international diffusion influences. “Understanding how diffusion outcomes 
differentiate during the course of policy adoption and implementation within individual 
countries and, further, how these outcomes and processes differentiate between 
countries will necessitate venturing beyond the international level and paying greater 
attention to tracing the longitudinal dimension of policy development within domestic 
political arenas. 
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